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Abstract 
This paper assesses the global economic implications  of the proposed strict documentation 
requirements on traded shipments of potentially genetically modified (GM) commodities under the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. More specifically, we evaluate the trade diversion, price, and welfare 
effects of requiring all shipments to bear a list of specific GM events (the “does contain” rule) in the 
maize and soybean sectors. Using a spatial equilibrium model with 80 maize- and 53 soybean-trading 
countries, we show that information requirements would have a significant effect on the world market for 
maize and soybeans. But they would have even greater effects on trade, creating significant trade 
distortion that diverts exports from their original destination. The measure would also lead to significant 
negative welfare effects for all members of the Protocol and nonmembers  that produce GM maize, 
soybeans, or both. While non-GM producers in Protocol member countries would benefit from this 
regulation, consumers and producers in many developing countries would have to pay a proportionally 
much heftier price for such a measure.  
 
Key words: Genetically modified food, international trade, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
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1.  Introduction 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB), a supplementary agreement to the United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity introduced in 2000 (Secretariat of the COB 2000), entered into force 
in September 2003 with the goal of setting up a harmonized framework of risk assessment, risk 
management, and information sharing on the transboundary movements of living modified organisms 
(LMOs).
1 Within the Protocol, a number of rules focus on LMOs intended for direct uses as food or feed, 
or  in  food or feed processing (noted  as  LMO-FFPs), which are essentially unprocessed genetically 
modified (GM) agricultural commodities.
2
Article 18.2(a) of the Protocol requires that each traded shipment of LMO-FFPs be labeled as 
“may contain” LMO-FFPs not intended for release in the environment, though the Convention also noted 
that a more specific rule on information requirements should be determined at a later date (Secretariat of 
the COB 2000). At a March 2006 meeting in Brazil, after a contentious debate, Protocol members agreed 
to adopt a two-option rule consisting of a more stringent option and the less stringent one that had 
previously been in effect (ICTSD 2006). Under the stringent option, shipments containing LMO-FFPs 
identified through means such as identity-preservation (IP) systems would be labeled as “does contain” 
LMO-FFPs and would include a list of all GM events present in each shipment. Shipments containing 
LMO-FFPs that are not well identified would follow previous practice and would be labeled as “may 
contain” LMO-FFPs. At the same time, a complete list of GM events commercialized in the exporting 
country would be available to importers via the Biosafety Clearing House (BCH), an internet database. At 
the same meeting, Protocol members also agreed that the two-option rule would be reconsidered, with the 
possibility of making the stringent “does contain” option mandatory for all countries (ICTSD 2006). At 
  
                                                           
1 Also called genetically modified organisms.  
2 These products represent more than half the total import value of the four main GM commodities. Approximately 
51 percent of the import value of soybeans and 88 percent of that of maize comes from unprocessed commodities 
(Gruère 2006).  
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the latest meeting of parties in October 2010 in Nagoya, Japan, discussion on the issue was postponed to 
leave time for data collection, but it is planned to get the topic back to the table in 2014.  
While the benefits of this proposed change are highly debatable, its implementation would 
generate significant new costs (see, for example, Gruère and Rosegrant 2008; Kalaitzandonakes 2004; 
and Redick 2007). More specifically, under the “does contain” rule, countries that produce and export 
only non-GM products would be exempt from verifications and tests, while countries that export GM 
products would have to test each shipment to verify the accuracy of GM event identification. Importers 
that are ratifying parties of the CPB would also need to pay for the IP system or to conduct tests to 
confirm the validity of shipment statements in order to ensure enforcement of mandatory information 
requirements. 
Previous studies have analyzed the economic implications of adopting the “does contain” rule in 
different countries, such as Argentina (Direccion Nacional de Mercados Agroalimentarios 2004), the 
United States (Kalaitzandonakes 2004), and Australia (Foster and Galeano 2006), reporting that the costs 
of such a change would be potentially significant. More recently, Huang et al. (2008) showed that the cost 
of implementation would be high  globally but not really significant for China (their focus country). 
Gruère and Rosegrant (2008) assessed the potential implementation costs of article 18.2(a) on all member 
countries of Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
3
Yet most of these studies provide short-run, partial-cost estimates of the strict rule in particular 
regions, leaving aside potential price and trade diversion effects. Huang et al. (2008) do did  use a 
multiregion computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the potential trade effects of this new 
measure, showing that it would affect the prices of maize and soybeans. But their approach focused only 
 and provided a range of cost estimates for 
exporters and importers, noting the disproportionate  cost for developing  countries that have been 
supportive of this measure. They also showed that it would effectively constitute a new entry cost for GM 
adoption and for Protocol membership in the APEC region.  
                                                           
3 APEC is a regional trade body covering 21 countries located around the Pacific Ocean, from Chile to New 
Zealand, including large traders like Mexico, the United States, Canada, China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and 
Australia. 4 
 
on a few regions (China, the Americas, and the world), used the 2001 Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) database, and did not provide a detailed assessment of potential trade diversions. Furthermore, 
the CGE  modeling approach prevents the appearance of new trade flows, leaving aside significant 
possibilities in trade diversion. While their results showed that the cost of implementation would be high 
for all but not really significant for China, they noted that other developing countries would likely pay a 
higher price.  
The objective of this paper is to complement previous studies by providing a comprehensive 
global trade assessment of strict documentation requirements in all member countries of the Protocol. In 
particular, our analysis intends to evaluate the market effect it would have on developing countries that 
are members of the Protocol. To do so, we develop a spatial trade model and simulate scenarios to 
evaluate the trade diversion, price, and welfare effects of implementing the “does contain” rule on the 
maize and soybean sectors in all significant trading countries, using data from multiple sources in the 
reference period 1995–2005. The model incorporates transportation costs, uses a lower level of product 
analysis (four-digit codes of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System [HS]), includes 
more countries than GTAP-based models include, and accounts for trade diversion and the creation of 
new trade flows. 
The results of our policy simulation intend to provide an overview of the medium- to long-run 
effects of mandating the “does contain” rule to all members of the Protocol, ahead of future negotiations 
on the issue. Developing countries that are members of the CPB have been vocal supporters of using 
precautionary measures for trade of GM commodities, such as Article 18.2(a), but they may have 
underestimated the cost of such measures  on their economies. Beyond the cost estimates and their 
geographic and product differentiation, our findings aim at giving an outlook of a possible future trade 
scenario for GM commodities in the presence of increasingly stricter trade regulations in specific trade 
blocs.  5 
 
In the following section we provide a conceptual framework for analysis. We then present the 
simulation model, data, and policy scenarios. The fourth section presents and discusses the first results of 
our simulations, and we close the paper with some policy conclusions. 
   6 
 
2.  Conceptual Framework 
While the “may contain” and “does contain” rules may share usefulness for regulatory purposes, their 
costs of implementation widely differ. Under the “does contain” rule, countries that export GM products 
would have to test each shipment to verify the accuracy of the list of GM events, whereas the “may 
contain” rule would not require additional tests beyond those to reject unapproved events in the importing 
countries. Even if all GM events were approved in all importing nations, the exporter would be required 
to provide precise information on each shipment. This could also include additional insurance costs for 
shippers against the rejection of shipments. On the importing side, CPB member countries would need to 
pay for the IP system or pay to conduct tests to confirm the validity of shipment statements in order to 
ensure enforcement of the requirements. Naturally, importers would also have to pay the price for the 
information, given the additional testing and insurance applied to shipments.  
   Given these considerations, we propose an analytical framework based on the characterization of 
Gruère and Rosegrant (2008) that categorizes countries to assess the cost of information requirements. 
More specifically, we divide countries into four groups according to their membership in the CPB and 
whether they produce GM maize or GM soybeans, as presented in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1—Characterization of the four groups by GM production status and CPB membership 
Group  Produces GM?*  Member of the CPB  Example of country 
1  Yes  No  Argentina, U.S.A. 
2  No  Yes  Japan, Mexico 
3  Yes  Yes  Brazil, South Africa 
4  No  No  Russia 
Source: Authors, based on Gruère and Rosegrant (2008). 





                                                           
4 Naturally the groups will differ by commodity, depending on whether a country produces GM corn, GM soybeans, 
or both. 
 is used to impose the effect of strict information on specific trade flows, that 
is, those flows that link groups of GM maize– or GM soybeans–producing countries to groups of CPB 7 
 
members. Two types of trade relationships are bound to be affected, those that will request testing at the 
import and export sides, linking GM producers (Groups 1 and 3) to CPB members (Groups 2 and 3), and 
those that would affect only exporters, linking CPB member GM-producing countries (Group 3) to non-
CPB member countries (Groups 1 and 4).  
We use this framework to set up a simplified partial equilibrium model of trade with four 
countries (A, B, C, and D) representing the four groups (1 to 4), to illustrate the potential price effect of 
such regulation. A and C produce GM, B and D do not, and B and C are members of the CPB while A and 
D are not. Each country I faces a linear supply S
I defined by the inverse relationship 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑐𝑘
𝐼𝑄𝐼, whose 
slope coefficient depends on whether the country adopts GM (k = g) or not (k = n). We assume that the 




𝐷, and that A and C are net exporters, 
while the two others are net importers. The demand in each country is linear and defined by the inverse 
demand equation 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑎𝐼𝑄𝐼 + 𝑏𝐼   where (𝑎𝐼 < 0). The equilibrium price is reached when all excess 
supply equals excess demand. The original world price (𝑝0
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.  (1) 
The proposed regulation is modeled as an additional transport cost for GM and non-GM products 
from A to B, from A to C,
5 and from C to B, for simplification.
6
The main equations are the following. The world price is 
 Let us assume a per-unit cost of τ, applied 
as a relative tariff on the affected trade flows. At the equilibrium, there are two prices for commingled 
commodities: one with affected flows and the other with non affected. The affected equilibrium is going 
to be defined by the relationship between A, B, and C, while the non affected one will be defined by the 





𝐴 �   (2) 
                                                           
5 The basic transport costs are not included explicitly here, because we focus on the new costs associated with the 
regulation, but they are treated with care in the empirical application. 
6 We exclude trade flows from C to C and from C to A and D. 8 
 






















































Using these equations, we find that at the equilibrium, the price of the non affected area (subscript OUT), 







































In this simplified case, the cost of the regulation acts as a wedge between the two prices—the 
higher the cost, the larger the difference between the two. The international price may or may not differ, 
but the local consumer price will increase in B and C, and may decrease in A and D. Therefore consumers 
in A and D may experience welfare gain, but because of the tariff-like effect, producers in A, C, and 
potentially D will lose, while producers in B will gain. In the long term, countries may decide to produce 
or abandon GM, while others may decide to join or abandon the CPB. If the effect on price is significant, 
A producers may try to avoid planting new GM crops, to lower additional losses. 
Naturally the use of this aggregate trade model can only provide a crude, medium-term, and 
inaccurate appreciation of what information requirements will do. Not all GM producers are large 9 
 
exporters; not all importers are the same; and transport costs, tariffs, and the structure of supply and 
demand vary widely from one country to another, even within the same group. We will now turn to our 
simulation model to explore the observable effects of the strict option under specific scenarios in the case 
of GM maize and GM soybeans. 
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3.  Model and Scenarios 
We built a spatial trade equilibrium model (Samuelson 1952, Takayama and Judge 1971) of the 
international market for maize and soybeans, which includes N  countries (80 and 53 for maize and 
soybeans,  respectively), that produce, export, or  import these two commodities. All countries are 
maximizing their welfare function subject to a set of spatial trade arbitration equations. The structure of 
the model is based on the application by Devadoss et al. (2005) in the case of trade of timber.
7
𝑄𝑊 = �(𝗼𝑖 − 𝗽𝑖𝑦𝑖)𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1



























objective function is a quasi-welfare function (QW) that Devadoss et al. (2005) called  a net social 
monetary gain function, defined as 
, 
(9) 
where αi, βi, γi, and δi are the positive demand and supply coefficients, respectively; yi is the quantity 
demanded and xi the quantity produced in country i; tij is the transportation cost from i to j and xij the 
volume exported from i to j; 𝜌𝑗
𝐷 and 𝜌𝑖
𝑆 are the market supply and demand prices for maize (which 
accounts for constraints in and access to the international market);  and  𝜀𝑖𝑗  is the ad valorem  tariff 
equivalent for an import of maize from i to j. The market prices should not be confused with the country 
prices, �𝑝𝑖
𝐷,𝑝𝑖
𝑆�, which are defined by the inverse demand and supply equations 𝑝𝑖
𝐷 = 𝗼𝑖 − 𝗽𝑖𝑦𝑖 and 
𝑝𝑖
𝑆 = 𝗾𝑖 + 𝗿𝑖𝑥𝑖. This objective function is maximized subject to the following set of feasibility 
constraints, capacity constraints, and arbitrage conditions: 
  ∀𝑖 ∈ ⟦1,𝑁⟧      ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ,  (10) 
 
                                                           
7 Sobolevsky, Moschini, and Lapan (2005) also used a spatial equilibrium model in the case of the GM soybeans, 
focusing on different actors in the chain in four regions, and used it to simulate different scenarios on segregation 
and GM import bans.  11 
 
∀𝑖 ∈ ⟦1,𝑁⟧      ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 ≤ 𝑥𝑖              (10) 
∀𝑗 ∈ ⟦1,𝑁⟧       ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 ≥ 𝑦𝑗              (11) 
∀𝑖 ∈ ⟦1,𝑁⟧      𝗼𝑖 − 𝗽𝑖𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝜌𝑖
𝐷             (12) 
∀𝑖 ∈ ⟦1,𝑁⟧      𝗾𝑖 + 𝗿𝑖𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝜌𝑖
𝑆              (13) 
∀(𝑖,𝑗) ∈ ⟦1,𝑁⟧ 2     �1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗��𝜌𝑖
𝑆 + 𝑡𝑖𝑗� ≥ 𝜌𝑗
𝐷          (14) 
∀(𝑖,𝑗) ∈ ⟦1,𝑁⟧ 2      �𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0,𝑦𝑖 ≥ 0,𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 �         (15) 
Equations (10) and (11) imply that the total quantity exported by i does not exceed I’s production 
and that the total quantity imported by j is greater than or equal to j’s demand. Equations (12) and (13) 
state that the market demand price should not exceed the country demand price and that the market supply 
price should be greater than or equal to the country supply price. When these inequalities are binding, in 
the case of an interior solution, market and country prices are equal, and the country produces or 
consumes a nonzero quantity of maize. The fifth constraint, given by equation (14), relates the market 
supply price (accounting for transport costs and tariffs) to the market demand price, and the last condition, 
in equation (15), is that demand, supply, and trade are nonnegative. 
Table 3.1—List of exporting and importing countries included in the model by group 
  Group  Maize  Soybeans 
Net 
exporters 
1  Argentina, U.S.A.  Argentina, Canada, U.S.A. 
2  Austria, Bulgaria, China, France, Hungary, 
India, Namibia, Paraguay, Romania, 
Swaziland, Thailand, Uganda, Ukraine 
Austria, Ecuador, India, Russia, 
Slovakia, Tanzania, Ukraine, 
Uganda, Vietnam 
3  Brazil, Czech Republic, South Africa  Brazil, Paraguay 
4  Moldova   Malawi, Moldova  
Net 
importers 
1  Canada, Uruguay  Uruguay 
2  Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium–
Luxembourg, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, 
Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Netherlands, North Korea, Panama, Peru, 
Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, South Korea, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Turkey, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, 
Bolivia, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, Croatia, Egypt, El 
Salvador, France, Germany, 
Guatemala, Greece, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, 
North Korea, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe 12 
 
Zimbabwe 
3  Germany, Philippines, Spain  Mexico, South Africa 
4  Angola, Chile, Israel, Jamaica, Kuwait, 
Malawi, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Source: Authors.  
Note: The groups are based on the year 2009 for protocol membership and 2008 for GM maize production (James 
2008).  
 
Table 3.1 shows the list of countries retained for the simulation; this includes all countries with 
maize production, export, or import volume during the period 1995–2005 exceeding 0.1 percent of total 
volume, and for which key data were available. Because spatial trade models allow for only unidirectional 
bilateral trade flows, we distinguish net exporters from net importers based on United Nations Comtrade 
data at the HS four-digit level (HS-4 1005 for maize and 1201 for soybeans) from 1995 to 2005.  
Table 3.2—Data sources for key parameters 
Parameter  Years  Sources of original data 
Production  1995–2005  FAOSTAT, UN Food and Agricultural Organization 
Domestic prices  1995–2005  FAOSTAT, UN Food and Agricultural Organization 
Consumer prices  1995–2005  FAOSTAT, UN Food and Agricultural Organization 
Elasticities of supply  2001–2005  IMPACT model, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Elasticities of demand  2001–2005  IMPACT model, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Net trade flows  1995–2005  UN Comtrade 1005 and 1201 (HS-4) bilateral trade data 
Transportation costs  2004–2006  Ocean freight rates from the International Grains Council 
Ad valorem tariffs  2005  MAcMap database 
Source:  CEPII (2010), FAOSTAT (2010), International Grains Council (2010),Rosegrant et al (2008), UN 
COMTRADE (2010) 
Table 3.2 summarizes the major sources of data used for key parameters. As noted above, we 
assume linear supply and demand in each country, with initial coefficients based on production data from 
the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) FAOSTAT database, and supply and demand elasticities 
obtained from the International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade 
(IMPACT) of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Transportation costs for each 
bilateral trade flow are estimated using reported ocean freight rates from the International Grains Council 13 
 
as references, and distances between ports are computed with data from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives 
et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). Tariff rates are based on the MAcMap HS-6 database
8 of ad 
valorem–equivalent aggregate tariffs developed by the CEPII and the International Trade Centre (ITC). 
Producer and consumer prices are derived from above-listed data and consumer and producer support 
equivalents from IMPACT and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
9
Because of the inconsistency across data sources and incomplete datasets for some of the 
parameters, we use cross-entropy methods to calibrate the data, following a procedure used by Robinson, 
Cattaneo, and El-Said (2001) and by You and Wood (2006). More specifically, the parameterization is 
completed in two stages. In the first stage, bilateral trade data are entered and rebalanced in order to 
respect two constraints: There is no bilateral trade flow between two countries and a country cannot 
simultaneously import from one partner and export to another one. In the second stage, transport costs are 
adjusted to fit with the rest of the data, in particular the trade data. In these two stages, the prior 
distributions of probabilities for the parameters of interest (bilateral trade flows and transport costs) are 
based on distributions of frequencies of trade volume per exporter and of transport costs directly derived 
from available data. The support used for these cross-entropy stages is therefore a uniform distribution. 
The third stage runs the model of quasi-welfare maximization in a standard fashion using a nonlinear 
solver in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS).  
  
                                                           
8 See Bouët et al. 2008. 
9 The complete procedures, though not presented here, are available from the authors. 
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Table 3.3—Definitions of scenarios 
  Affected trade flows by group 
of countries 
Additional cost imposed on trade flows (US$) 
Base  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Set A  1→2, 1→3, 2→2, 2→3  $0  $1.50/ton  $6.50/ton  $13/ton 
Set B  1→2, 1→3, 2→2, 2→3  $0  $1.50/ton  $6.50/ton  $13/ton 
3→1, 3→4  $0  $1/ton  $5/ton  $9/ton 
Source: Authors, based on Gruère and Rosegrant (2008). 
We run six scenarios of simulations by implementing marginal increases in transport costs of affected 
trade flows of potentially GM maize and soybeans. Table 3.3 presents each of the scenarios. Set A 
imposes additional transport costs only on flows between GM producers (Groups 1 and 3) and CPB 
members (Groups 2 and 3). Set B includes the same shocks but also includes additional costs for exports 
from GM-producing countries that are CPB members (Group 3) toward nonmembers (Groups 1 and 4). In 
other words, Set A provides a minimum (or pragmatic) implementation of the requirements by CPB 
members, and Set B shows the situation if CPB members implement the requirements to all their exports 
as long as they produce GM crops.  
Under each set, the base scenario represents the initial situation, which can be interpreted as the 
“may contain” option. Scenario 1 introduces a small per-volume cost on affected trade flows, based on a 
sum of the export and import costs assumed by Gruère and Rosegrant (2008) but also consistent with the 
costs estimated by Huang et al. (2008) in the case of China. Scenarios 2 and 3 impose higher additional 
costs, following Gruère and Rosegrant (2008), who cite JRG Consulting Group  (2004) and 
Kalaitzandonakes (2004), that represent less efficient testing systems
10
                                                           
10 JRG Consulting Group (2004) and Kalaitzandonakes (2004) studied the cases of major exporters of GM products, 
with very advanced infrastructure, and therefore their proposed costs may still be low compared with the actual 
transport costs for smaller, developing countries. But because they are much higher than those of Huang et al. 
(2008), which appear to be more precise, we take them as benchmark values for a possible high-end cost of 
implementation.  
  and that may be more 
representative of the costs for less developed trading countries. In each case, we focus on three key 
variables: the relative changes in trade volume, prices, and quantities in major countries. For notification 15 
 
simplicity, the scenarios in Set A will be written A1, A2, and A3, and the scenarios in Set B will be 
designated B1, B2, and B3.    16 
 
4.  Simulation Results 
Scenarios in Set A 
Changes in Main Market Variables 
Table 4.1—Relative changes (%) in world market variables compared to the Base in Set A. 
  Maize  Soybeans 
Scenario  A1  A2  A3  A1  A2  A3 
Aggregate quantity  -0.04%  -0.16%  -0.33%  -0.05%  -0.22%  -0.45% 
Average p
S  +0.37%  +1.41%  +3.06%  +0.37%  +1.57%  +3.10% 
Average p
D  +0.69%  +2.70%  +5.76%  +1.05%  +2.66%  +4.72% 
Source: Derived from simulation results. 
 
At the global level (Table 4.1), the additional cost imposed on the main affected trade flows decreases the 
total production of maize by 190,771 metric  tons
11
 
  (Scenario A1) to 1.6 million tons  (A3) and the 
production of soybeans by 98,689 tons (Scenario A1) to 855,276 tons (A3). As expected, an increase in 
the cost of information requirements amplifies the effects the requirements have on the world market. The 
average country’s supply price increases by up to 3.06 percent in Scenario A3 for maize and 3.1 percent 
for soybeans. The average country’s demand price also increases, signifying a drop in demand, by up to 
4.72 percent for soybeans and 5.76 percent for maize in Scenario A3. However, these results do not 
provide a good overview of the changes experienced at a lower level of aggregation. Since the shocks are 
implemented by group, it is useful to first analyze differences in groups, as shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2—Relative changes (%) in key variables compared to the base in each group of countries  
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
Scenario  A1  A2  A3  A1  A2  A3  A1  A2  A3  A1  A2  A3 
Maize                         
Supply  -0.14  -0.69  -1.38  +0.09  +0.53  +1.0  -0.13  -0.63  -1.16  -0.05  -0.38  -0.73 
Demand  +0.24  +1.22  +2.42  -0.19  -0.95  -1.86  -0.34  -1.37  -2.96  +0.09  +0.63  +1.22 
Average p
S  -0.57  -2.85  -6.34  +0.63  +2.7  +5.7  -0.78  -4.16  -7.87  -0.06  -0.7  -1.39 
Average p
D  -0.57  -2.85  -6.34  +0.89  +3.73  +7.9  +1.43  +5.44  +11.3  -0.27  -2.19  -4.25 
Soybeans                         
Supply  -0.79  -0.35  -0.69  +0.04  +0.18  +0.35  -0.06  -0.27  -0.55  +0.01  +0.05  +0.09 
                                                           
11 All weights are given in metric tons. 17 
 
Demand  +0.05  +0.21  +0.43  -0.15  -0.63  -1.27  -0.16  -0.72  -1.43  -0.04  -0.16  -0.31 
Average p
S  -0.81  -3.51  -7.02  +0.5  +2.22  +4.43  -0.71  -3.08  -6.17  +0.8  +2.67  +4.34 
Average p
D  -0.81  -3.51  -7.02  +0.6  +2.55  +5.09  +0.67  +2.9  +5.81  +0.63  +1.43  +1.24 
Source: Derived from simulation results. 
Group 1, including GM-producing countries whose exports are affected (see tables A1 and A2 in 
the appendix), does experience a decrease in supply and supply prices. Between Scenarios A1 and A3, the 
production of maize and soybeans declines by 285,345  tons  to 2.8 million tons and 84,235 tons  to 
729,976 tons respectively, which are non-negligible amounts. In the case of maize, most of this decline is 
experienced by the United States (-271,375 to -2.65 million tons), but all Group 1 countries do reduce 
their production. With the average demand price decreasing by 0.57 to 6.34 percent for maize and by 0.8 
to 7 percent for soybeans, internal demand does increase by about 433,993 to 4.3 million tons for maize 
and by 47,244 to 409,418 tons for soybeans, which have to come from a reduction of exports or an 
increase in imports.  
Results for Group 2, which includes non-GM producers who are members of the CPB, are 
opposite in direction and amplitude. Countries in this group slightly increase their production of maize 
and soybeans due to the effect of the new tariff-like measures, but they decrease their demand because of 
an increase in consumer prices. This region is the largest consumer of maize, and a decline in demand of 
1.86  percent  for maize  and  1.28  percent  for soybeans  in  Scenario  A3 translates into a reduction of 
consumption by about 4.3 million tons for maize and 747,615 tons for soybeans. This suggests that the 
region does increase its imports  of  maize and soybeans  more  than  it increases its exports overall. 
However, the group includes a large number of countries that do not all share the same trend. India, Italy, 
France, and Nigeria experience large decrease in demand for maize (exceeding 230,000 tons), but China 
is the only country with a drop exceeding 1 million tons. On the supply side, China, France, Italy, and 
India lead the group in production increase of maize (ranging from 133,889 tons in Italy to 806,902 tons 
in China in Scenario A3). These increases suggest significant domestic changes, resulting in increased 
maize exports to countries of other groups. China and India also experience the largest decrease in 18 
 
demand  for  soybeans between Scenario  A1 and A3 (exceeding 300,000 tons  and 130,000 tons, 
respectively). On the supply side, China increases its production of soybeans from 6,953 tons to 60,271 
tons; India and Bolivia also experience a large increase in their production of soybeans between A1 and 
A3 (from 3,967 tons to 34,392 tons and from 1,311 tons to 11,364 tons respectively). 
Group 3 countries,  which  include GM producers that are CPB members, represent an 
intermediate situation for maize, with decreased supply and demand, a higher demand price, and a 
reduction in the supply price. But the drop in demand (from -180,775 tons in Scenario A1 to -1,568,318 
tons in Scenario  A3) largely exceeds the decrease in supply (from -83,438 tons to  -732,749 tons), 
signifying a growing maize surplus. Most of the decline in demand is borne by Brazil (-946,456 tons in 
A3), South Africa (-291,435 tons), and Spain (-214227 tons). The decrease in supply is also experienced  
greatly by Brazil (-416,133 tons in A3) and, to a lesser extent, South Africa (-142,217 tons in A3), but 
much less by other countries in the group.  
Similar results can be highlighted for soybeans in terms of variation of supply, demand, and 
prices. Soybeans also experience a growing surplus as evidenced by the drop in demand (from -59,311 
tons in A1 to -514,072 tons in A3), which greatly exceeds the decrease in supply (from -29,310 tons to 
-254,000 tons between A1 and A3). Once again, Brazil experiences the larger decline in demand (from 
-57,214 tons in A1 to -495,896 tons in A3) and in supply (from -25,586 tons to -221,731 tons). To a lesser 
extent, Paraguay follows with a decrease in demand (-14,202 tons in A3) smaller than the decrease in 
supply (-30,176 tons in A3). 
Lastly, Group 4, which includes non-GM producers that are not CPB members, has a distinct 
pattern with, on average, negligible changes in supply and demand, following the same pattern as Group 
2. However, the minor observed decrease in demand is associated with a minor decrease in demand 
prices, suggesting the presence of heterogeneous effects in countries with differentiated demand 
elasticities. Indeed, unlike other groups, there is a significant variation of demand effects within Group 4. 
Moldova  experiences lower maize demand (-1,636 tons in A1 to -14,858 tons in A3) while larger 
countries, like Chile (+41,126 tons in A3), Russia (+21,639 tons), and Pakistan (+16,305 tons), increase 19 
 
their demand for maize. Israel (+21,691 tons in A3) and, to a greater extent, Malawi (+55,225 tons) also 
experience a significant growth in demand. These variations are consistent with demand price fluctuations 
across countries. Significant variations are also observable on the supply side, with Moldova producing 
more maize (up to +13,847 tons) to take advantage of higher supply prices, while other countries decrease 
their production, especially larger countries such as Russia, Chile, and Pakistan. To a lesser extent, these 
results also apply to soybeans, with a slight decrease in demand (-3,065 tons in A3) and a growing supply 
(+3,839 tons) in Russia, while Bosnia and Herzegovina records the opposite trend. 
Trade Effects 
The simulation results on trade are generally consistent with our expectations; trade flows that 
bear additional costs are affected. But the magnitude of trade diversion is perhaps more significant than 
expected and varies across regions and scenarios. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show a decomposition of aggregate 
bilateral trade flows by group under the three scenarios for the two crops, based on Tables A.3 (maize) 
and A.4 (soybeans) in the Appendix. The top 10 and bottom 10 variations of disaggregated bilateral trade 
flows are reported by scenario in Tables A.5, A.6, and A.7 in the Appendix. 
Figure 4.1—Changes in maize trade volume (metric tons) relative to the base under the three 








































































Figure 4.2—Changes in soybean trade volume (metric tons) relative to the base under the three 

















































Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
In Scenario A1, an additional cost is imposed on trade flows going from Group 1 and Group 3 to Group 2 
and 3 (see Table 3.3). These trade flows are greatly reduced because of the additional transport cost. In 
particular, Groups 1 and 3 export around 3.7 million (124,000) tons of maize (soybeans) to Group 2, and 
203,353 fewer tons of maize and 64,000 fewer tons of soybeans to Group 3 than in the base scenario. But 
these deficits are partially compensated for by exports from other groups; Groups 2 and 4 export 3.3 
million tons of maize and 37,700 tons of soybeans to Group 2. A domino effect follows, with countries in 
affected groups (1 and 3) diverting their exports toward non-affected groups (1 and 4), and countries in 
compensating groups (2 and 4) reducing their exports to affected exporters (1 and 3). Still, in aggregate, 
the total net trade volume is reduced by 190,772 tons of maize and 98,690 tons of soybeans, and all 
groups import less maize and soybean than before. But only Group 1 reduces its total export of maize and 
soybeans because of the additional cost, as shown in Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.3—Changes in MAIZE AND SOYBEANS export volume (metric tons) relative to the base 
under the scenarios in Set A 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Total 
Maize 























A2  -3,611,490  685,926  285,293  12,889  -2,627,381 
A3  -7,017,858  1,497,366  734,081  28,705  -4,757,705 
Soybeans 
A1  -131,280  16,892  29,784  838  -83,765 
A2  -568,851  73,204  129,084  3,632  -362,931 
A3  -1,137,667  146,412  258,192  7,264  -725,799 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
The same general effects are observed on a larger scale under Scenarios A2 and A3 (Figures 4.1 
and 4.2 and Table 4.3). Overall, compared with the base, the total trade volume of maize and soybeans 
decreases by 771,366 and 427,643 tons and 1.6 million (855,276) tons in scenarios A2 and A3 compared 
to the basis, respectively. Results from Scenario A2 are fully consistent with those from A1 but on a 
larger scale. Results from Scenario A3, however, do deviate minimally; instead of diminishing, exports of 
maize from Group 2 to Group 3 increase slightly by a non significant amount (+17,228 tons as shown in 
Table A.3 in the Appendix). This increase is more significant for soybeans (+87,644 tons) than for maize. 
This may be because exports to Group 2 are so much diminished (-9.5 million tons of maize from Groups 
1 and 3, and -1.6 million tons of soybeans from Group 1) that compensating Group 2 sends an even larger 
volume to this group than to Group 3, creating an excess demand in Group 3 that may be met by minimal 
additional amounts from exporters in Group 2 (see Table A.4 in the Appendix).  
At the country level, the largest changes are experienced by major trading countries in Groups 1 
and 3, as expected. For instance, in Scenario A1, the United States decreases its trade balance of maize by 
about 694,465 tons overall, but it decreases mainly its exports to Japan (Group 2) and Spain (Group 3), by 
2 million tons and 22,000 tons, respectively. Its exports of maize increase toward Group 4: Morocco 
(+509,259 tons) and Chile (+783,185 tons). In the same scenario, Brazil (Group 3), India (Group 2), and 
France (Group 2) export more maize overall (with the trade balance increasing by 53,544, 67,218, and 
46,500 tons, respectively), but Brazil exports 44,000 and 11,000 fewer tons to Venezuela and Colombia, 
respectively (Group 2), which is compensated for by an increase in exports of 110,912 tons to Morocco 24 
 
(Group 4). South Africa (Group 3) also decreases its exports of maize to various Group 2 countries by 
33,819 tons but compensates by exporting 75,960 tons more to Russia (Group 4).  
Results for soybeans are similar but with lower volumes, perhaps because of a lower flexibility in 
the market.
12
Scenarios in Set B 
 The United States experiences the largest decrease in net exports (-65,520 tons overall in 
Scenario A1), especially toward Group 2: China (-46,087 tons) and Japan (-17,392 tons). Brazil and 
Paraguay (Group 3) increase their exports (+69,219 tons overall in Scenario A1) toward countries of 
Group 2 (Japan, Zimbabwe, and Germany) and Group 1 (Uruguay). 
Change in Main Market Variables 
Table 4.4 shows the relative changes in prices and quantities at the global level. These results are almost 
identical to the ones under Set A when comparing the three scenarios (Table 4). In particular, the volume 
of production and the average of supply and demand prices experience identical relative changes. This 
may indicate that the additional changes have only minor effects on the market, given that they do not 
represent major trade flows. 
Table 4.4—Relative changes (%) in world market variables under scenarios in Set B compared 
with the base  
  Maize  Soybeans 
Scenario  B1  B2  B3  B1  B2  B3 
Aggregate quantity  -0.04%  -0.16%  -0.33%  -0.05%  -0.22%  -0.45% 
Average p
S  +0.4%  +1.4%  +3.1%  +0.38%  +1.58%  +3.10% 
Average p
D  +0.7%  +2.7%  +5.8%  +0.50%  +2.13%  +4.20% 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
Table 4.5—Relative changes (%) in key variables in each group of countries under scenarios in Set 
B compared with the base 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
Scenario  B1  B2  B3  B1  B2  B3  B1  B2  B3  B1  B2  B3 
                                                           
12 Soybean production and exports are concentrated in a few North and South American countries.  25 
 
Maize                         
Supply  -0.13  -0.7  -1.38  +0.07  +0.53  +0.99  -0.13  -0.63  -1.17  -0.01  -0.32  -0.69 
Demand  +0.23  +1.2  +2.4  -0.17  -0.95  -1.86  -0.35  -1.37  -2.9  +0.06  +0.57  +1.2 
Average p
S  -0.53  -2.86  -6.34  +0.65  +2.68  +5.7  -0.85  -4.36  -8.1  +0.02  -0.58  -1.3 
Average p
D  -0.53  -2.86  -6.34  +0.9  +3.7  +7.9  +1.36  +5.24  +11  -0.1  -1.9  -4.08 
Soybeans                         
Supply  -0.08  -0.35  -0.7  +0.04  +0.18  +0.35  -0.06  -0.27  -0.5  +0.01  +0.05  +0.09 
Demand  +0.05  +0.21  +0.43  -0.15  -0.63  -1.27  -0.16  -0.7  -1.4  -0.05  -0.22  -0.45 
Average p
S  -0.8  -3.5  -7  +0.5  +2.2  +4.4  -0.7  -3.1  -6.2  +0.8  +2.67  +4.3 
Average p
D  -0.8  -3.5  -7  +0.58  +2.54  +5.1  +0.7  +2.9  +5.8  +0.6  +1.4  +1.24 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
Table 4.5 presents the same relative changes by group. Once again, the results are similar to the 
ones obtained under Set A, in terms of both signs and quantitative relative changes from the base. A few 
changes appear for selected scenarios and variables, but never exceeding +/-0.2 percent. The only visible 
difference concerns Group 4 in the case of soybeans. This group, a relatively lower trader of soybeans 
than others, experiences additional costs for its imports from CPB members (countries of Group 3) 
compared with Set A. This results in slightly different effects on the demand side under scenarios B2 and 
B3, compared with A2 and A3. While Group 1 also witnesses the same changes for imports from CPB 
members, the effects of additional transport costs are negligible, because the group is made up of mostly 
net exporting regions, or regions that may compensate for their losses.  
Trade Effects 
The trade effects of the shocks implemented under scenarios B1, B2, and B3 are presented in Figures 4.3 
and 4.4 and Table 4.6 (total exports by group). In addition, detailed bilateral group flows are shown in 
Tables A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix, as was done in the case of Set A. At first view, the aggregate results 
of Table 4.6 appear quite similar to those observed in Table 4.3 (Set A). Total trade volume of maize is 
reduced by 468,433 tons and soybeans by 83,765 tons under B1; the reductions for the two commodities 
are 2.6 million tons and 362,931 tons under B2, and 4.8 million under B3 (725,799); slightly less than 
under A3. All groups reduce their imports, and only Group 1 reduces its exports. But in the detail, the 
amplitude and direction of intra- and intergroup trade change greatly, as visible in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.  26 
 
Figure 4.3—Changes in maize trade volume (metric tons) relative to the base under the three 












































































Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
Figure 4.4—Changes in soybean trade volume (metric tons) relative to the base under the three 












































































Table 4.6—Changes in maize and soybean export volume (metric tons) relative to the base under 
the scenarios in Set B 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Total 
Maize 
B1  -718,557  162,866  84,097  3,162  -468,433 
B2  -3,611,490  685,926  285,293  12,889  -2,627,381 
B3  -7,017,858  1,497,366  734,081  28,705  -4,757,705 
Soybeans 
B1  -131,280  16,892  29,784  838  -83,765 
B2  -568,851  73,204  129,084  3,632  -362,931 
B3  -1,137,667  146,412  258,192  7,264  -725,799 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
For maize and soybeans, Group 1 countries follow the same pattern as under Set A: They export 
much less to Groups 2 and 3, and compensate by exporting more to Groups 1 and 4. But the magnitude of 
these diversions is much greater than under Set A. In particular, Group 1 reduces its maize (respectively 
soybean) exports to Group 2 by 3.2 million (0.13 million tons) to 10.8 million tons (2.53 million tons), 
depending on the scenario, instead of 2 to 8 million tons (maize) and 0.12 million to 1.6 million tons 
(soybeans) under Set A. Interestingly, these changes happen despite the fact that Group 1 is not directly 
affected by the new transport costs. Group 2 also follows the same diversion pattern as under Set A, 
diverting its exports to Groups 2 and 3 to compensate for the losses due to Group 1’s trade reductions. 
Group 2’s overall imports and exports are very similar to those under Set A. On the import side, however, 
Group 2 experiences a much larger shift in maize suppliers, notably because of the much larger drop in 
exports from Group 1. But instead of making up the volume from itself and from Group 4 (as under Set 
A), it receives a large amount of maize (-188,151 tons to 1.2 million tons) and soybeans (2,300 tons to 1.2 
million of tons) from Group 3. 
Group 3 is in fact the most affected by these additional changes, as expected. It faces additional 
costs for all its maize and soybean exports, regardless of their destination, but with more costs imposed on 30 
 
trade to Group 2 and itself than to Group 1 and 4. Interestingly, however, these relatively smaller changes 
on exports to Groups 1 and 4 lead to a complete switch in export diversion for Group 3. Group 3 reduces 
its exports to Groups 1 and 4, and significantly increases its exports to Group 2 under Scenarios B2 and 
B3. This may be due to different market considerations, but likely mostly to trade preference factors, such 
as regular tariffs and transport costs, as well as Group 3 exporters’ own competitiveness compared with 
that of other countries. The drastic drop in exports from Group 1 to Group 2 may also be a driver of this 
preference for exporting to Group 2, which has the largest set of importers. Despite these significant 
changes, the aggregate exports and imports under Set B scenarios are virtually identical to those under Set 
A scenarios (they are actually identical for soybeans). The effect is a simple and pure trade diversion. 
Lastly, trade from and to Group 4 is relatively unaffected by the new measure compared with the results 
for Scenario A. Its total imports do decrease more than under Set A but by relatively small volumes.  
 At the country level (Tables A.8, A.9, and A.10 in the Appendix), the largest changes can be 
seen in major trading nations of Group 1 and especially Group 3. For instance, in the case of Scenario B1, 
the United States (Group 1) reduces its maize exports by 4.16 million tons to Japan (Group 2). It also 
reduces its maize exports to Vietnam (-14,954 tons) and Turkey (-10,205 tons), both from Group 2. These 
reductions are compensated for by increased maize exports to Group 4: Morocco (+932,173 tons), Chile 
(+782,839 tons), Malawi (+590,932 tons), Kuwait (+403,115 tons),  and to a smaller extent, Angola 
(+77,944 tons) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (+12,750 tons). The United States also experiences increased 
maize exports toward Group 2 countries by 1.17 million tons to Malaysia and by more than 600,000 tons 
each to Ecuador, Belgium, Bangladesh, Greece, Honduras, Libya, Mauritius, Italy, and Slovenia. Its 
exports to Germany (Group 3) also increase significantly, by 485,300 tons.
13
 Brazil (Group 3) significantly decreases its maize exports to Colombia and Cuba (Group 2) by 
1.2 million tons and 853,414 tons, respectively, and to a smaller extent, toward Vietnam (Group 2) by 
about 87,600 tons. These decreases are compensated for by increased exports to other countries within 
Group 2: Tanzania (+717,000 tons), Sudan (+573,214 tons), Mozambique (+394,000 tons), Kenya (+ 
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325,912 tons), and Yemen (+190,876 tons). South Africa reduces its exports to Germany (Group 3) by 
about 459,000 tons, and to Group 2 countries Ecuador (-116,806 tons); Belgium (-87,596 tons); Greece 
and Honduras (down more than 70,000 tons each); and to a lesser extent, Slovenia, Israel, Egypt, and 
Syria (down less than 4,000 tons each). These reductions are compensated for by exporting an additional 
590,729 tons and 300,971 tons toward closer Japan and Bangladesh (Group 2), respectively. As expected, 
each of these changes is consistent with a cost-minimizing effort on behalf of the exporting country; 
substitutions are made only to countries at similar distance or closer, or those that have similar or not 
significantly different trade policies.  
As with maize, the largest changes for soybeans can be seen in major trading nations of Group 1 
and Group 3. Under Scenario B1, the United States (Group 1) decreases its soybean exports by more than 
50,000 tons to China and Poland (Group 2), while Paraguay (Group 3) reduces its exports by 33,135 tons 
to Zimbabwe (Group 2) and by about 6,600 tons to Spain (Group 2). Brazil (Group 3) also decreases its 
exports to Group 2 countries Bolivia, Italy, and Spain by more than 4,000 tons each and compensates by 
additional exports of 24,480 tons and 19,654 tons of soybean exports to Uruguay (Group 1) and Japan 
(Group 2), respectively. Paraguay (Group 3) increases its exports to Germany (Group 2) by about 38,000 
tons. 
 
Discussion: From Markets to Welfare Effects 
The results from the simulations have shown that implementing strict information requirements with the 
“does contain” option on maize and soybeans could have significant market and especially trade effects. 
However, although there is less trade and smaller volume of maize or soybeans, which constitute clear 
market losses, not all countries will experience similar welfare outcomes. In this section we look further 
by analyzing economic welfare for countries in different regions.  
We use the slope and intercept coefficients and the supply and demand variables to compute 
Marshallian consumer and producer surpluses for each country and group in each scenario. Figures 4.5, 32 
 
4.6, and 4.7 show the absolute changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total surplus for each 
group compared with the base. Tables A.11 and A.12 in the Appendix provide the results by country for 
Scenario B3. 
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The results show that the distribution of welfare effects for both maize and soybeans is indeed 
quite heterogeneous. Generally, the effects observed for maize are replicated in the case of soybeans at a 
smaller scale (except for Group 4); the main differences are observed across groups. On the consumer 
side, Group 1 is bound to gain from lower prices, while Groups 2 and 3 lose. These effects are amplified 
when moving toward more costly scenarios. On the producer side, Group 2 gains from increased trade 
costs imposed on competitors (which act like protectionist rents), and Groups 1 and 3 lose from loss of 
market access and price restrictions. The amplitude of these gains and losses also increases with more 
costly scenarios. On both sides, Group 4 experiences small changes in welfare, positive or negative, that 










































Still, when considering both producer and consumer surplus (Figure 4.7), Group 4 is the only one 
that derives net welfare gains, which grow from A1 to A3 and B2 to B3, with minimal losses under B1. In 
contrast, Group 3 does experience non-negligible net losses for maize from US$89 million
14
  Overall, these results show that most countries (54 out of 80 countries for maize and 41 out of 53 
for soybeans, as shown in tables A.11 and A.12 in Appendix) are bound to lose with strict information 
requirements, which confirms the conclusions of other studies. But they also shed light on some of the 
key supports for such requirements as the Cartagena Protocol. Nonmembers have only an indirect role to 
play in negotiation, so even if the large trading countries in Group 1 (like Argentina, Canada, or the 
United States) continue to push against it, they may not advance much. Group 4 countries are absent from 
discussions, as smaller traders and non-members. The core of the support obviously needs to come from 
member countries in Groups 2 and 3, groups that are both bound to lose overall, especially Group 3 
countries for maize (Brazil and Romania are the biggest losers, as shown in Table A.11 in the Appendix) 
and Groups 2 and 3 countries for soybeans (Brazil and Japan are the biggest losers, as shown in Table 
A.12 in the Appendix). Yet member countries of these groups (especially Brazil, European countries, and 
African countries) have generally been very supportive of the strict requirements in meetings of the 
Protocol. So why do they support a measure that could be economically detrimental for them? 
  under 
Scenarios A1 and B1 to $773 million under Scenarios A3 and B3. To a smaller extent, the total welfare 
losses (which include lost tax revenues) are also quite significant for soybeans, from $62 million under 
Scenarios A1 and B1 to more than $535 million under Scenarios A3 and B3. Interestingly, Group 2 
countries overall, representing CPB members, lose more than Group 1 countries, which are not members 
of the CPB, but that result is mostly because Group 2 countries together are net importers of maize and 
soybeans, and because consumers bear more of the surplus than do producers.  
  As in other political forums, a well-known result from the literature (Olson 1965) is that the best-
organized groups are bound to be the most influential. In developed countries, the most influential or 
well-organized parties tend to be on the production side. Results presented in Figures 4.6 and 4.7 suggest 
                                                           
14 All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars. 37 
 
that producers, especially in countries of Group 2, are bound to gain from this measure significantly. In 
other countries of Group 2, notably those in Africa, producers and consumers are typically not well 
represented, and the support for such measure has been seen from anti-GM organizations, which are 
pushing for any restriction in the marketing of GM food.  
Yet these countries are bound to be directly affected by the measure, with potentially high losses 
at stake. Table 4.7 shows the welfare results for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in our study in the 
case of Scenario B3. Of the twelve CPB member SSA countries included in the study, only Uganda 
(maize and soybeans), Tanzania (soybeans), Namibia (maize), and Swaziland (maize) would experience 
welfare gains overall, due to production gains and the small number of consumers in the first three 
countries, and due to the gains of consumers in a small producing country in the third country. Consumers 
in Group 4 countries (Angola and Malawi) would gain. But at the same time, eight countries, and 
especially Nigeria and South Africa, would bear nontrivial welfare losses.  
    
Table 4.7—Change in welfare effects in Sub-Saharan African countries under Scenario B3 
compared with the base scenario, in U.S. dollars per year 
 
Group  Country  Maize  Soybeans 


















2  Kenya  -16,863,690  14,953,707  -1,909,983  0  0  0 
2  Mozambique  -11,424,342  8,616,742  -2,807,600  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
   Mauritius  -4,337,626  0  -4,337,626  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
2  Namibia  0  12,780,857  12,780,857  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
2  Nigeria  -31,825,904  0  -31,825,904  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
2  Senegal  -5,052,061  862,223  -4,189,838  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
2  Swaziland  -453,620  12,915,522  12,461,902  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
2  Tanzania  -19,693,684  14,974,529  -4,719,155  0  9,332,821  9,332,821 
2  Uganda  -5,153,379  17,194,193  12,040,814  -770,629  9,551,946  8,781,316 
2  Zambia  -8,312,453  3,308,317  -5,004,136  -3,864,878  88,967  -3,775,911 
2  Zimbabwe  -12,215,160  7,929,417  -4,285,743  -4,462,323  502,835  -3,959,488 
3  South Africa  -50,317,745  -43,092,970  -93,410,716  -4,878,721  -954,005  -9,515,636 
4  Angola  4,864,907  -1,813,459  3,033,795  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
4  Malawi  10,282,904  -6,995,551  3,287,353  0  9,306,972  9,306,972 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 38 
 
Note: n.a. = Not available—countries not included in the soybean model.  
 
While small producers in SSA countries (mostly in Group 2) do not always connect to the market 
(an implicit assumption here), urban consumers are immediately affected by price increases, as observed 
during the food price increase of 2008. This means that the presumed gains for producers may be 
overestimated here while consumers’ losses may be underestimated. Producers in Groups 3 and 4 that are 
connected to the market will also lose. Even South Africa will experience large losses for both producers 
and consumers. All these groups will probably pay a much larger proportional price than consumers in 
developed nations of Groups 2 and 3, given their resources, or even producers in some of the most 
productive countries of Group 3.  
Naturally, these welfare effects would change if countries were to change their group. Countries 
like Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda are part of a large public–private partnership to develop drought-
tolerant GM maize, and if they adopted this promising crop, they would join Group 3 and would thus bear 
welfare losses for both producers and consumers. This “penalty effect” for GM adoption provides a 
rationale for why the measure is so strongly supported by anti-GM groups. If in place, it could further 
discourage developing countries in Africa that are already subject to external influence (see, for example, 
Paarlberg 2008) from moving toward GM crop adoption.  
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5.  Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the economic effects of implementing a strict information requirement (“does 
contain LMO-FFPs” with a list of specific GM events) under Article 18.2(a) of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. More specifically, our analysis focuses on evaluating the effect on prices, trade, and welfare of 
implementing this regulation at the global level. 
Using a simple analytical model, we first show that such regulation would create price tension 
with losers and winners. We then use an empirical model to validate our hypothesis in the case of maize 
and soybeans. We find that under relatively conservative cost assumptions, information requirements 
would have a significant effect on the world market for both maize and soybeans. But they would have 
even greater effects on trade, creating significant trade distortion that diverts exports from their original 
destination. In particular, nonmember countries that produce GM products would reduce their exports to 
Protocol members, and GM-producing countries that are part of the Protocol would also divert their 
exports to new destinations, depending on the scenario. The measure would reduce world trade and 
production in maize and soybeans, with significant welfare effects.  
At the global level, under the more costly scenario, total welfare effects (consumer and producer 
surplus plus tax revenue) would decline by up to $1.036 billion annually for maize and by up to $716 
million annually for soybeans, with significant heterogeneity across countries and agents. While non-GM 
producers in Protocol member countries would benefit from increased protection, consumers and 
producers in selected countries of SSA would proportionately pay a much heftier price for the regulation. 
Even those that derive gains from new protectionist rents would lose if they decided to adopt potentially 
beneficial GM crops currently under development, like drought-resistant maize. This situation calls for 
governments in African and other affected countries to reconsider their support for this new regulation, 
which does not present any clear benefit for regulators but, if implemented, would be associated with 
significant costs for generations to come.  
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Appendix: Additional Tables 
Table A.1—Change in export volume (metric tons) relative to the base under the six scenarios for 
maize  
 
  A1  A2  A3  B1  B2  B3 
Argentina  -24,093  -121,090  -235,302  -22,557  -121,304  -235,450 
USA  -694,465  -3,490,400  -6,782,556  -650,195  -3,496,566  -6,786,838 
Austria  7,437  30,317  67,518  7,762  30,272  67,486 
Bulgaria  1,678  14,052  31,294  1,827  14,031  31,280 
France  46,502  189,577  422,199  48,538  189,296  422,004 
Hungary  14,882  60,669  135,114  15,533  60,579  135,052 
India  67,218  265,288  541,286  69,609  264,955  541,054 
Namibia  75  304  677  78  304  677 
Paraguay  3,617  14,748  32,844  3,776  14,726  32,828 
Swaziland  944  3,849  8,571  985  3,843  8,567 
Thailand  3,110  36,174  99,858  551  36,097  99,804 
Uganda  6,565  26,765  59,607  6,853  26,725  59,580 
Ukraine  10,838  44,184  98,399  11,312  44,118  98,354 
Brazil  53,544  190,792  530,323  60,579  189,821  529,649 
Czech Republic  851  1,521  3,073  189  377  1,664 
Romania  8,073  23,333  51,467  9,145  23,183  51,363 
South Africa  21,629  69,647  149,218  23,845  69,339  149,004 
Moldova  3,162  12,889  28,705  3,300  12,870  28,692 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
Table A.2—Change in export volume (metric tons) relative to the base under the six scenarios for 
soybeans  
 
  A1  A2  A3  B1  B2  B3 
Argentina  -58,748  -254,564  -509,113  -58,748  -254,564  -509,113 
Austria  87  378  756  87  378  756 
Brazil  31,628  137,072  274,166  31,628  137,072  274,166 
Canada  -7,011  -30,381  -60,760  -7,011  -30,381  -60,760 
Ecuador  146  633  1,266  146  633  1,266 
India  15,872  68,781  137,566  15,872  68,781  137,566 
Moldavia  37  159  318  37  159  318 
Malawi  5  20  41  5  20  41 
Paraguay  -1,844  -7,988  -15,974  -1,844  -7,988  -15,974 
Russia  797  3,452  6,905  797  3,452  6,905 
Slovakia  9  39  79  9  39  79 
Tanzania  0  2  4  0  2  4 
Uganda  39  170  340  39  170  340 
Ukraine  492  2,131  4,262  492  2,131  4,262 41 
 
U.S.A.  -65,520  -283,906  -567,794  -65,520  -283,906  -567,794 
Venezuela  3  12  25  3  12  25 
Vietnam  238  1,031  2,062  238  1,031  2,062 
Zambia  6  26  53  6  26  53 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
Table A.3—Change in trade volume (metric tons) relative to the base under the six scenarios for 
maize  
    To 1  To 2  To 3  To 4  Total 
A1 
From 1  433,993  -2,066,237  -22,724  1,369,623  -285,345 
From 2  0  3,312,822  -4,026  -3,126,336  182,460 
From 3  0  -1,716,922  -180,629  1,814,113  -83,438 
From 4  0  39,281  0  -43,730  -4,449 
   Total  433,993  -431,056  -207,379  13,670  -190,772 
      To 1  To 2  To 3  To 4  Total 
A2 
From 1  2,181,258  -4,466,579  -85,498  936,668  -1,434,151 
From 2  0  4,239,306  -14,689  -3,126,336  1,098,281 
From 3  5  -2,033,984  -731,929  2,367,559  -398,349 
From 4  0  49,008  0  -86,158  -37,150 
Total  2,181,263  -2,212,248  -832,116  91,734  -771,367 
      To 1  To 2  To 3  To 4  Total 
A3 
From 1  4,335,510  -8,426,293  -216,570  1,470,409  -2,836,944 
From 2  0  5,155,959  17,228  -3,126,336  2,046,851 
From 3  -526  -1,120,165  -1,583,204  1,971,145  -732,750 
From 4  0  64,824  0  -136,463  -71,639 
Total  4,334,984  -4,325,675  -1,782,546  178,756  -1,594,481 
      To 1  To 2  To 3  To 4  Total 
B1 
From 1  406,854  -3,238,347  461,436  2,102,902  -267,155 
From 2  0  2,990,845  30,006  -2,870,562  150,289 
From 3  -526  -188,151  -706,715  816,163  -79,229 
From 4  0  39,419  0  -40,274  -855 
Total  406,328  -396,234  -215,273  8,228  -196,951 
B2     To 1  To 2  To 3  To 4  Total 42 
 
From 1  2,185,643  -7,178,650  -99,770  3,656,093  -1,436,684 
From 2  0  4,208,457  14,253  -3,126,336  1,096,374 
From 3  -526  712,501  -744,823  -366,637  -399,485 
From 4  0  48,989  0  -79,915  -30,926 
Total  2,185,117  -2,208,702  -830,340  83,205  -770,720 
B3 
   To 1  To 2  To 3  To 4  Total 
From 1  4,338,328  -10,799,805  -176,226  3,798,926  -2,838,777 
From 2  0  5,211,903  -39,272  -3,126,336  2,046,295 
From 3  -526  1,198,826  -1,565,476  -366,637  -733,813 
From 4  0  64,811  0  -132,545  -67,734 
Total  4,337,802  -4,324,265  -1,780,974  173,409  -1,594,028 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
Note: Shaded cells represent affected trade flows. 
Table A.4—Change in trade volume (metric tons) relative to the base under the six scenarios for 
soybeans 
    To 1  To 2  To 3  To 4  Total 
A1  From 1  47,045  -126,280  -5,000  0  -84,235 
  From 2  -27,281  36,882  4,783  -17  14,367 
  From 3  27,480  2,304  -59,095  0  -29,311 
  From 4  0  838  0  -349  489 
   Total  47,244  -86,256  -59,311  -366  -98,690 
    To 1  To 2  To 3  To 4  Total 
A2 
From 1  203,852  -557,040  -11,811  0  -364,999 
From 2  -27,281  695,544  10,872  -616,875  62,260 
From 3  28,144  -515,931  -256,089  616,871  -127,005 
From 4  0  3,632  0  -1,532  2,100 
Total  204,715  -373,796  -257,028  -1,535   -427,644 
    To 1  To 2  To 3  To 4  Total 
A3 
From 1  407,692  -1,665,099  -89,522  616,954  -729,976 
From 2  -27,281  681,036  87,644  -616,875  124,525 43 
 
From 3  29,008  229,184  -512,194  0  -254,002 
From 4  0  7,264  0  -3,087  4,177 
Total  409,418  -747,615  -514,072  -3,008   -855,276 
    To 1  To 2  To 3  To 4  Total 
B1 
From 1  47,045  -130,918  -361  0  -84,234 
From 2  -27,281  41,520  145  -17  14,384 
From 3  27,480  2,304  -59,095  0  -29,311 
From 4  0  838  0  -349  489 
Total  47,244  -86,256  -59,311  -366   -98,672 
B2 
   To 1  To 2  To 3  To 4  Total 
From 1  1,216,747  -1,835,457  -363,161  616,871  -365,000 
From 2  -27,281  368,224  338,192  -616,875  62,260 
From 3  -984,751  1,105,826  -248,079  0  -127,004 
From 4  0  -12,388  16,020  -1,532  2,100 
Total  204,715  -373,796  -257,028  -1,535   -427,644 
B3 
   To 1  To 2  To 3  To 4  Total 
From 1  1,421,451  -2,528,565  -239,816  616,954  -729,976 
From 2  -27,281  530,743  237,938  -616,875  124,525 
From 3  -984,751  1,242,943  -512,194  0  -254,002 
From 4  0  7,264  0  -3,087  4,177 
Total  409,418  -747,615  -514,072  -3,008   -855,276 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
Note: Shaded cells represent affected trade flows.44 
 
Table A.5—Change in export volume (metric tons) relative to the base under Scenario A1: Top 10 
and bottom 10 trade flows 
  Maize  Soybeans 
  Exporter  Gp.  Importer  Gp.  A1  Exporter  Gp.  Importer  Gp.  A1 
Bottom 
10 
U.S.A.  1  Japan  2  -2,043,532  U.S.A.  1  China  2  -46,087 
Uganda  2  Morocco  4  -931,942  Argentina  1  Poland  2  -27,622 
Czech Rep.  3  Nigeria  2  -669,621  India  2  Uruguay  1  -27,281 
France  2  Chile  4  -603,303  Ecuador  2  Germany  2  -25,808 
France  2  Pakistan  4  -568,343  U.S.A.  1  Japan  2  -17,392 
Czech Rep.  3  Sri Lanka  2  -484,336  Argentina  1  Un. Kingdom  2  -12,848 
Hungary  2  Iran  2  -460,190  Paraguay  3  Zimbabwe  2  -12,806 
France  2  Russia  4  -452,677  Brazil  3  Zimbabwe  2  -9,720 
Swaziland  2  Iran  2  -451,490  Argentina  1  Colombia  2  -7,394 
Austria  2  Bosnia-Herz.  4  -282,808  Canada  1  Japan  2  -7,011 
Top  
10 
Czech Rep.  3  Bosnia-Herz.  4  283,154  India  2  Hungary  2  5,469 
U.S.A.  1  Morocco  4  509,259  India  2  Philippines  2  5,469 
France  2  Sri Lanka  2  531,194  India  2  Poland  2  5,469 
Czech Rep.  3  Russia  4  546,623  Ecuador  2  Un. Kingdom  2  5,469 
Swaziland  2  Nigeria  2  582,529  India  2  Un. Kingdom  2  5,469 
Czech Rep.  3  Pakistan  4  594,509  Russia  4  Colombia  2  6,882 
U.S.A.  1  Chile  4  783,185  Paraguay  3  Germany  2  17,447 
Hungary  2  Japan  2  896,275  Ecuador  2  Poland  2  21,876 
France  2  Iran  2  950,620  India  2  Zimbabwe  2  22,426 
Uganda  2  Japan  2  1,098,893  Brazil  3  Japan  2  24,292 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
Table A.6—Change in export volume (metric tons) relative to the base under Scenario A2: Top 10 
and bottom 10 trade flows 
  Maize  Soybeans 
  Exporter  Gp.  Importer  Gp.  A2  Exporter  Gp.  Importer  Gp.  A2 
Bottom 
 10 
U.S.A.  1  Japan  2  -4,159,330  Brazil  3  Bolivia  2  -501,060 
Thailand  2  China  2  -1,199,270  Uganda  2  Bosnia-Herz.  4  -432,243 
Uganda  2  Morocco  4  -931,942  India  2  Turkey  2  -234,542 
Argentina  1  Malaysia  2  -841,513  India  2  Bosnia-Herz.  4  -184,632 
Czech Rep.  3  Nigeria  2  -727,999  India  2  Egypt  2  -182,532 
Argentina  1  Libya  2  -653,104  Argentina  1  Poland  2  -162,159 
France  2  Chile  4  -603,303  U.S.A.  1  Thailand  2  -130,349 
Hungary  2  Philippines  3  -574,536  Ukraine  2  China  2  -123,903 
France  2  Pakistan  4  -568,343  Ecuador  2  Zimbabwe  2  -104,966 
U.S.A.  1  Egypt  2  -564,026  U.S.A.  1  China  2  -80,452  45 
 
Top 10 
Czech Rep.  3  Pakistan  4  607,664  Russia  4  Colombia  2  20,346 
Romania  3  Libya  2  632,932  Brazil  3  Uruguay  1  28,144 
Argentina  1  Venezuela  2  704,129  Brazil  3  Japan  2  95,385 
Argentina  1  Japan  2  719,280  Ukraine  2  Thailand  2  117,054 
Brazil  3  Morocco  4  789,684  Ecuador  2  Poland  2  146,735 
U.S.A.  1  Chile  4  805,020  India  2  Zimbabwe  2  158,979 
U.S.A.  1  Malaysia  2  838,654  Uganda  2  Egypt  2  179,617 
France  2  Iran  2  932,177  Uganda  2  Turkey  2  230,674 
Uganda  2  Japan  2  1,119,093  India  2  Bolivia  2  488,289 
Hungary  2  Japan  2  1,312,283  Brazil  3  Bosnia-Herz.  4  616,871 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
 
Table A.7—Change in export volume (metric tons) relative to the base under Scenario A3: Top 10 
and bottom 10 trade flows 
  Maize  Soybeans 
  Exporter  Gp.  Importer  Gp.  A3  Exporter  Gp.  Importer  Gp.  A3 
Bottom  
10 
U.S.A.  1  Japan  2  -4,159,330  Argentina  1  Un. Kingdom  2  -595,491 
Thailand  2  China  2  -1,857,582  Uganda  2  Bosnia-Herz.  4  -432,243 
Uganda  2  Morocco  4  -931,942  Argentina  1  Poland  2  -295,261 
Argentina  1  Malaysia  2  -820,895  U.S.A.  1  China  2  -284,820 
U.S.A.  1  Greece  2  -780,970  India  2  Turkey  2  -234,542 
Czech Rep.  3  Nigeria  2  -727,999  U.S.A.  1  Japan  2  -196,367 
U.S.A.  1  Croatia  2  -692,480  India  2  Bosnia-Herz.  4  -184,632 
France  2  Chile  4  -603,303  India  2  Egypt  2  -182,532 
Hungary  2  Philippines  3  -574,536  Ecuador  2  Zimbabwe  2  -147,764 
France  2  Pakistan  4  -568,343  Ukraine  2  China  2  -123,903 
Top  
10 
Argentina  1  Angola  4  562,121  Brazil  3  Bolivia  2  82,944 
Czech Rep.  3  Russia  4  582,496  Ukraine  2  South Africa  3  87,644 
India  2  Croatia  2  605,554  Russia  4  Colombia  2  89,544 
South Africa  3  Greece  2  645,414  India  2  Zimbabwe  2  115,147 
U.S.A.  1  Chile  4  716,828  Uganda  2  Egypt  2  176,701 
France  2  Iran  2  790,355  Uganda  2  Turkey  2  226,806 
France  2  Japan  2  797,160  Ecuador  2  Poland  2  244,635 
Swaziland  2  Nigeria  2  823,567  Brazil  3  Japan  2  256,635 
Uganda  2  Japan  2  1,151,935  India  2  Un. Kingdom  2  583,537 
Hungary  2  Japan  2  1,386,728  Argentina  1  Bosnia-Herz.  4  616,954 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
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Table A.8—Change in export volume (metric tons) relative to the base under Scenario B1: Top 10 
and bottom 10 trade flows 
  Maize  Soybeans 
  Exporter  Gp.  Importer  Gp.  B1  Exporter  Gp.  Importer  Gp.  B1 
Bottom 10 
U.S.A.  1  Japan  2  -4,159,330  U.S.A.  1  China  2  -50,798 
U.S.A.  1  Egypt  2  -2,011,723  Argentina  1  Poland  2  -50,567 
Namibia  2  Nigeria  2  -1,782,003  Ecuador  2  Germany  2  -46,359 
Argentina  1  Malaysia  2  -1,276,783  Paraguay  3  Zimbabwe  2  -33,135 
Brazil  3  Colombia  2  -1,206,428  India  2  Uruguay  1  -27,281 
Uganda  2  Morocco  4  -931,942  U.S.A.  1  Japan  2  -12,752 
Brazil  3  Cuba  2  -853,414  Canada  1  Japan  2  -7,011 
Austria  2  Tanzania  2  -734,536  Paraguay  3  Spain  2  -6,595 
Argentina  1  Libya  2  -653,104  Brazil  3  Italy  2  -4,733 
France  2  Chile  4  -603,303  Brazil  3  Bolivia  2  -4,292 
Top 10 
Argentina  1  Cuba  2  851,836  India  2  Bolivia  2  1,574 
Argentina  1  Peru  2  917,556  Uganda  2  Bosnia-Herz.  4  1,604 
U.S.A.  1  Morocco  4  932,173  Russia  4  Colombia  2  2,334 
Uganda  2  Japan  2  1,053,263  Vietnam  2  Thailand  2  2,764 
U.S.A.  1  Malaysia  2  1,170,383  Ukraine  2  China  2  3,642 
Argentina  1  Colombia  2  1,194,559  Brazil  3  Japan  2  19,654 
Austria  2  Iran  2  1,378,181  Brazil  3  Uruguay  1  27,480 
Ukraine  2  Nigeria  2  1,386,112  Paraguay  3  Germany  2  37,887 
Namibia  2  Japan  2  1,782,081  India  2  Zimbabwe  2  38,918 
France  2  Egypt  2  1,907,269  Ecuador  2  Poland  2  49,369 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
Table A.9—Change in export volume (metric tons) relative to the base under Scenario B2: Top 10 
and bottom 10 trade flows 
  Maize  Soybeans 
  Exporter  Gp.  Importer  Gp.  B2  Exporter  Gp.  Importer  Gp.  B2 
Bottom 
 10 
U.S.A.  1  Japan  2  -4,159,330  Brazil  3  Uruguay  1  -984,751 
Thailand  2  China  2  -1,196,722  Canada  1  Japan  1  -684,717 
Uganda  2  Morocco  4  -931,942  Argentina  1  Un. Kingdom  1  -595,491 
Argentina  1  Libya  2  -653,104  Uganda  2  Bosnia-Herz.  1  -432,243 
Namibia  2  Nigeria  2  -649,368  Argentina  1  South Africa  1  -371,394 
U.S.A.  1  Greece  2  -628,664  Argentina  1  Poland  1  -241,376 
U.S.A.  1  Egypt  2  -627,508  India  2  Turkey  1  -234,542 
France  2  Chile  4  -603,303  U.S.A.  1  Japan  1  -196,367 
France  2  Pakistan  4  -568,343  India  2  Bosnia-Herz.  1  -184,632 




Czech Rep.  3  Nigeria  2  601,630  Brazil  3  Bolivia  1  94,726.1 
U.S.A.  1  Pakistan  4  604,281  Ecuador  2  Zimbabwe  1  135,266.7 
Namibia  2  Japan  2  649,672  Uganda  2  Egypt  1  179,616.7 
Romania  3  Libya  2  651,622  Uganda  2  Turkey  1  230,674.1 
Swaziland  2  Peru  2  744,549  India  2  Poland  1  294,988.5 
France  2  Iran  2  932,213  Ukraine  2  South Africa  1  322,172.2 
U.S.A.  1  Morocco  4  937,208  India  2  Un. Kingdom  1  606,368.7 
Hungary  2  Japan  2  958,186  Canada  1  Bosnia-Herz.  1  616,871.4 
Uganda  2  Japan  2  1,119,053  Argentina  1  Uruguay  1  1,012,896 
Austria  2  Japan  2  1,347,846  Brazil  3  Japan  1  1,039,526 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
 
Table A.10—Change in export volume (metric tons) relative to the base under Scenario B3: Top 10 
and bottom 10 trade flows 
  Maize  Soybeans 
  Exporter  Gp.  Importer  Gp.  B3  Exporter  Gp.  Importer  Gp.  B3 
Bottom 
10 
U.S.A.  1  Japan  2  -4,159,330  Brazil  3  Uruguay  1  -984,751 
U.S.A.  1  Egypt  2  -2,025,745  Argentina  1  Un. Kingdom  2  -595,491 
Thailand  2  China  2  -1,857,582  Argentina  1  South Africa  3  -583,634 
Uganda  2  Morocco  4  -931,942  Argentina  1  Poland  2  -507,527 
U.S.A.  1  Greece  2  -780,970  Uganda  2  Bosnia-Herz.  4  -432,243 
U.S.A.  1  Croatia  2  -692,480  Vietnam  2  Indonesia  2  -426,121 
Czech Rep.  3  Nigeria  2  -654,687  Austria  2  Japan  2  -403,471 
Romania  3  Italy  2  -652,705  Argentina  1  Colombia  2  -370,125 
Argentina  1  Libya  2  -610,167  U.S.A.  1  China  2  -368,575 
France  2  Chile  4  -603,303  Russia  4  Hungary  2  -354,721 
Top  
10 
Argentina  1  Morocco  4  567,779  India  2  Hungary  2  314,520.2 
U.S.A.  1  Bosnia-Herz.  4  574,425  U.S.A.  1  South Africa  3  343,371.8 
India  2  Croatia  2  614,018  Russia  4  Colombia  2  365,690.8 
South Africa  3  Greece  2  683,471  Austria  2  Indonesia  2  404,226.8 
U.S.A.  1  Chile  4  830,764  Vietnam  2  Thailand  2  428,183.8 
Swaziland  2  Egypt  2  849,990  Ecuador  2  Poland  2  479,653.3 
Czech Rep.  3  Egypt  2  921,275  India  2  Un. Kingdom  2  598,088.5 
Uganda  2  Japan  2  1,151,908  Argentina  1  Bosnia-Herz.  4  616,954 
Hungary  2  Japan  2  1,386,666  Brazil  3  Japan  2  666,545.5 
France  2  Japan  2  1,432,215  Argentina  1  Uruguay  1  1,013,759 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
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Table A.11—Welfare effects for maize (Scenario B3 compared with base) by country in decreasing 
order of total surplus, in U.S. dollars per year 






France  2  -45,070,877  70,382,039  25,311,162 
India  2  -77,003,315  95,668,532  18,665,217 
Hungary  2  -34,203,209  50,622,027  16,418,819 
Ukraine  2  -25,388,278  40,027,374  14,639,096 
Austria  2  -8,931,600  23,321,346  14,389,746 
Bulgaria  2  -8,214,527  21,333,467  13,118,941 
Moldova  4  -8,061,054  21,031,769  12,970,715 
Namibia  2  0  12,780,857  12,780,857 
Swaziland  2  -453,620  12,915,522  12,461,902 
Uganda  2  -5,153,379  17,194,193  12,040,814 
Thailand  2  -22,255,120  34,071,475  11,816,355 
Paraguay  2  -3,321,440  13,590,844  10,269,404 
Morocco  4  5,214,748  -554,835  4,659,913 
Israel  4  4,488,106  0  4,488,106 
Chile  4  8,597,715  -4,374,424  4,223,291 
Malawi  4  10,282,904  -6,995,551  3,287,353 
Jamaica  4  3,272,035  0  3,272,035 
Kuwait  4  3,139,964  0  3,139,964 
Angola  4  4,864,907  -1,813,459  3,051,448 
Uruguay  1  3,818,429  -887,761  2,930,669 
Pakistan  4  9,459,700  -6,959,766  2,499,934 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  4  5,219,822  -2,878,746  2,341,076 
Russia  4  9,598,192  -7,279,777  2,318,415 
Canada  1  17,631,074  -17,465,876  165,198 
Indonesia  2  0  0  0 
Mexico  2  0  0  0 
South Korea  2  -770,675  320,610  -450,065 
Vietnam  2  -17,994,403  16,635,835  -1,358,568 
Kenya  2  -16,863,690  14,953,707  -1,909,983 
Mozambique  2  -11,424,342  8,616,742  -2,807,600 
China  2  -316,930,047  313,699,946  -3,230,101 
Italy  2  -68,848,536  65,568,770  -3,279,767 
Croatia  2  -17,133,267  13,776,914  -3,356,353 
Bolivia  2  -7,863,384  3,912,010  -3,951,374 
Sudan  2  -4,211,087  108,605  -4,102,483 
Sri Lanka  2  -4,301,331  186,266  -4,115,065 
Belgium-Luxembourg  2  -5,365,103  1,179,088  -4,186,015 
Senegal  2  -5,052,061  862,223  -4,189,838 49 
 
Zimbabwe  2  -12,215,160  7,929,417  -4,285,743 
Mauritius  2  -4,337,626  0  -4,337,626 
Yemen  2  -4,693,129  173,332  -4,519,797 
Bangladesh  2  -5,246,789  616,462  -4,630,327 
Lebanon  2  -4,655,887  15,818  -4,640,069 
Cyprus  2  -4,666,032  0  -4,666,032 
Tanzania  2  -19,693,684  14,974,529  -4,719,155 
Honduras  2  -8,028,624  3,220,785  -4,807,840 
Slovenia  2  -7,230,180  2,261,006  -4,969,174 
Panama  2  -5,402,121  430,733  -4,971,388 
Jordan  2  -5,075,638  93,294  -4,982,344 
Zambia  2  -8,312,453  3,308,317  -5,004,136 
Libya  2  -5,066,729  8,511  -5,058,218 
Costa Rica  2  -5,421,085  119,126  -5,301,960 
El Salvador  2  -9,059,598  3,607,092  -5,452,507 
Ecuador  2  -8,310,395  2,386,726  -5,923,669 
Greece  2  -20,496,971  14,139,394  -6,357,577 
Cuba  2  -6,562,586  0  -6,562,586 
Guatemala  2  -11,682,662  4,967,934  -6,714,728 
Peru  2  -13,113,143  6,258,229  -6,854,914 
Algeria  2  -7,671,730  3,406  -7,668,324 
Netherlands  2  -8,669,929  977,389  -7,692,539 
Syria  2  -7,911,981  0  -7,911,981 
Venezuela  2  -15,698,768  7,711,697  -7,987,071 
Turkey  2  -24,084,676  16,034,538  -8,050,138 
Saudi Arabia  2  -8,359,529  151,557  -8,207,972 
Colombia  2  -16,650,701  7,662,577  -8,988,125 
Malaysia  2  -10,363,537  349,630  -10,013,907 
Iran  2  -15,293,149  4,883,617  -10,409,531 
Egypt  2  -52,555,962  38,927,681  -13,628,281 
Czech Republic  3  -2,194,608  -12,101,598  -14,296,206 
Argentina  1  22,709,989  -47,099,824  -24,389,835 
Nigeria  2  -31,825,904  0  -31,825,904 
Germany  3  -23,256,453  -13,052,688  -36,309,141 
North Korea  2  -39,569,164  0  -39,569,164 
Japan  2  -40,103,626  0  -40,103,626 
Spain  3  -37,066,976  -18,195,357  -55,262,332 
Philippines  3  -34,583,943  -24,878,740  -59,462,683 
South Africa  3  -50,317,745  -43,092,970  -93,410,716 
USA  1  884,791,079  -986,061,468  -101,270,389 
Romania  3  -69,400,487  -53,422,320  -122,822,807 50 
 
Brazil  3  -205,837,242  -185,974,222  -391,811,464 
Source: Created by authors based on simulation results. 
 
Table A.12— Welfare effects for soybeans (Scenario B3 compared with base) by country in 
decreasing order of total surplus, in U.S. dollars per year 







India  2  -31,333,891  43,529,664  12,195,773 
Ukraine  2  -712,144  10,248,947  9,536,803 
Moldova  4  0  9,440,711  9,440,711 
Austria  2  -217,046  9,583,355  9,366,309 
Tanzania  2  0  9,332,821  9,332,821 
Slovakia  2  -51,195  9,371,420  9,320,226 
Vietnam  2  -986,436  10,237,045  9,250,609 
Russia  4  -2,151,588  11,131,251  8,979,663 
Ecuador  2  -425,826  9,404,555  8,978,729 
Uganda  2  -770,629  9,551,946  8,781,316 
Uruguay  1  7,583,946  -727,801  6,856,145 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  4  2,115,105  -19,665  2,095,439 
Kenya  2  0  0  0 
Venezuela  4  0  24,517  0 
Malawi  2  0  9,306,972  0 
Romania  2  -4,177,058  1,001,095  -3,175,964 
Sri Lanka  2  -3,317,201  8,441  -3,308,759 
El Salvador  2  -3,535,429  12,577  -3,522,853 
Poland  2  -3,667,056  527  -3,666,529 
Bolivia  2  -11,016,874  7,304,446  -3,712,428 
Zambia  2  -3864878  88967  -3775911 
Germany  2  -3809443  4395  -3805048 
Bulgaria  2  -3864116  25280  -3838836 
Czech Republic  2  -3870776  30931  -3839845 
Hungary  2  -4103575  262728  -3840847 
Slovenia  2  -3843806  566  -3843240 
Yugoslavia  2  -5088723  1214110  -3874613 
Croatia  2  -4315811  436330  -3879481 
United Kingdom  2  -3948360  0  -3948360 
Zimbabwe  2  -4462323  502835  -3959488 
Peru  2  -3974962  14977  -3959985 
Colombia  2  -4370028  366736  -4003293 
Honduras  2  -4050602  21288  -4029314 51 
 
Guatemala  2  -4247123  204975  -4042148 
France  2  -5448555  1237356  -4211200 
Egypt  2  -4421879  187015  -4234863 
Greece  2  -4320172  22261  -4297912 
Philippines  2  -4351975  7373  -4344602 
Turkey   2  -4717451  308842  -4408609 
Italy  2  -8979589  4310612  -4668977 
Indonesia  2  -11481954  6590847  -4891108 
South Africa  3  -4878721  -954005  -5832726 
Spain  2  -6309439  31406  -6278033 
South Korea  2  -7525700  760536  -6765164 
Thailand  2  -9155722  1839736  -7315986 
Canada  1  13545563  -24910303  -11364740 
Mexico  3  -10563844  -842515  -11406359 
China  2  -102190929  87415271  -14775658 
USA  1  475362089  -496772896  -21410807 
Argentina  1  129875487  -165597097  -35721609 
Paraguay  3  -18537941  -31789362  -50327303 
Japan  2  -89364565  1097388  -88267177 
Brazil  3  -189163459  -278298108  -467461567 
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